This paper investigates simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) for a multiple-input-singleoutput (MISO) secrecy channel. First, transmit beamforming without artificial noise (AN) is designed to achieve the secrecy rate maximization problem subject to the transmit power and the energy harvesting (EH) constraints. This problem is not convex, but this can be solved by applying a bisection search to a sequence of the associated power minimization problems, each of which can be solved by using a novel relaxation approach. Moreover, we extend our proposed algorithms to the robust case by incorporating channel uncertainties. Then, transmit beamforming with AN is investigated for the secrecy rate maximization problem, where two relaxation approaches are presented, i.e., a two-level optimization algorithm and a successive convex approximation (SCA), to solve the secrecy rate maximization problem. In addition, tightness analyses of rank relaxation are provided to show that the optimal transmit covariance matrix exactly returns rank one. Simulation results are provided to validate the performance of the proposed algorithms.
stations, hot spots, etc.) [3] [4] [5] . In this case, the role of the transmitter is not only to send the signal to the mobile receivers but to transfer power that can be used to charge these receivers' batteries as well. Simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) is a promising paradigm to provide power for communication devices to mitigate the energy scarcity and extend the lifetime of wireless networks [3] , [4] .
Over the past few years, the issue of secrecy performance has become increasingly crucial in wireless communication networks. In particular, there has been a growing interest in physical-layer security. Unlike traditional cryptographic methods that are employed to improve secrecy performance in the network layer, physical-layer security relies upon the principles of information theory to improve the security of wireless communications [6] [7] [8] .
Among all configurations that have been considered in the study of physical-layer security algorithms, the multipleantenna wiretap channel model has recently received a great deal of attention due to the advent of multiple-input-multipleoutput (MIMO) communication systems [9] , [10] . Several algorithms have thus been introduced to improve the physical-layer security performance of multiple-antenna transceivers. Some of these techniques, i.e., cooperative beamforming, cooperative jamming (CJ), artificial noise (AN), and device-to-device transmission (D2D), achieve their goal by attempting to increase the amount of interference received by eavesdroppers [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] .
Recently, secure communication in SWIPT has been investigated in [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] . In [19] , a multiple-input-single-output (MISO) system is considered. Two optimization problems, i.e., 1) secrecy rate maximization of IR subject to individual harvested energy constraints of energy receivers (ERs) and 2) EH maximization subject to a secrecy rate constraint for the IR, have been developed to guarantee that the reliable information transmission to the IR and the target harvested energy simultaneously transferred to the ERs are satisfied by optimally designing the beamforming vectors and their power allocation at the transmitter. In [21] , the secure communication system with SWIPT when two types of eavesdroppers (i.e., passive and potential) coexist is addressed. A total transmit power minimization problem was formulated to jointly optimize the transmit beamforming, AN, and energy beamforming, achieving secure communications with a target amount of harvested power by incorporating channel uncertainties of the idle receivers (potential eavesdroppers). On the other hand, the authors in [22] considered a multiuser MISO SWIPT system with multiantenna EH receivers (potential eavesdroppers) only, where an EH maximization problem is proposed to guarantee 0018-9545 © 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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secure communications. In addition, the authors have shown that there always exists a rank-one optimal transmit covariance solution and proposed one efficient algorithm to construct an equivalent rank-one optimal solution [19] , [22] . However, in [19] and [22] , the channel-state information (CSI) is assumed to be available, or only the CSI of the potential eavesdropper is unavailable at the transmitter [20] , [21] , for which there are practical difficulties in obtaining the CSI of the link between the transmitter and the users due to channel estimation and quantization errors. Furthermore, robust secure transmission for a MISO SWIPT system has been proposed without AN [24] , with AN [25] , and with CJ [26] , respectively, by incorporating the channel uncertainties of all channels. In [24] and [25] , semidefinite relaxation (SDR) has been studied to solve the secrecy rate maximization problem; however, the suboptimal solution has been proposed to guarantee that the solution of the relaxed problem is rank one [24] , whereas in [25] and [26] , the authors have shown that the optimal solution of the relaxed problem is rank two, which is not exact. Motivated by the existing work, in this paper, we consider the SWIPT scheme for a MISO secrecy system with multiple eavesdroppers and multiple EH receivers, where secure transmit beamforming without AN and that with AN are designed. The contribution of this paper is that we address the following problems.
1) Secrecy rate optimization without AN:
We formulate the secrecy rate maximization problem to design the transmit beamforming without AN, which is not convex and cannot be solved directly. Unlike the conventional SDR [24] , we propose a novel reformulation of the secrecy rate maximization problem based on the bisection search to solve a sequence of the associated power minimization problems, each of which can be solved by employing a novel relaxation. In addition, these associated robust schemes are investigated by incorporating channel uncertainties. 2) Secrecy rate optimization with AN: The secrecy rate maximization problem is formulated to jointly optimize transmit beamforming and AN. In this paper, we first propose the two-level problem: the inner level problem can be relaxed by SDR, the outer level problem is a single-variable optimization problem, which is solved by using a 1-D line search algorithm. Then, a successive convex approximation (SCA)-based secrecy rate maximization problem is proposed, where we approximate the nonconvex constraint and reformulate the secrecy rate maximization problem as a convex one. Moreover, we extend our proposed schemes to the robust case by incorporating channel uncertainties. Tightness analyses for the relaxation of the secrecy rate maximization problems are provided to show that the relaxed problem yields a rank-one solution.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. A system model is described in Section II. The secrecy rate optimization problems with SWIPT are solved to jointly optimize the transmit beamforming without AN in Section III. The secrecy rate optimization problem with SWIPT to jointly optimize the transmit beamforming with AN is investigated in Section IV. The computation complexity of the proposed algorithms is given in Section V. Section VI provides simulation results to support the proposed schemes. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section VII.
A. Notation
We use the upper case boldface letters for matrices and lower case boldface letters for vectors. (·) T , (·) * , and (·) H denote the transpose, conjugate, and conjugate transpose, respectively. Tr(·) and E{·} stand for trace of a matrix and the statistical expectation for random variables, respectively. Vec(A) is the vector obtained by stacking the columns of A on top of one another, and ⊗ is the Kronecker product. A 0 indicates that A is a positive semidefinite (PSD) matrix. I and (·) −1 denote the identity matrix with appropriate size and the inverse of a matrix, respectively. · 2 represents the Euclidean norm of a matrix. {·} stands for the real part of a complex number, whereas |A| denotes the determinant of A. [x] + represents max{x, 0}. The distribution of a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian vector with mean vector x and covariance matrix Σ is denoted by CN (x, Σ), and ∼ means "distributed as." The notation K denotes the following generalized inequality:
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a MISO secured SWIPT channel, comprising one multiantenna legitimate transmitter, one legitimate user, K eavesdroppers, and L EH receivers. It is assumed that the transmitter is equipped with N T transmit antennas, whereas the legitimate user, the eavesdroppers, and the EH receivers each have a single receive antenna. The channel coefficients between the legitimate transmitter and the legitimate user, the kth eavesdropper, as well as the lth EH receiver are denoted by h s ∈ C N T ×1 , h e,k ∈ C N T ×1 , and h l ∈ C N T ×1 , respectively. The noise power values at the legitimate user and the eavesdroppers are assumed to be σ 2 s and σ 2 e . The received signals at the legitimate user and the kth eavesdropper can be written as y s = h H s ws + n s , y e,k = h H e,k ws + n e,k , k = 1, . . . , K where s and w ∈ C N T ×1 are the desired signal for the legitimate user (E{|s| 2 } = 1) and the transmit beamforming at the legitimate transmitter, respectively. In addition, n s ∼ CN (0, σ 2 s ) and n e,k ∼ CN (0, σ 2 e ) represent the noise of the legitimate user and the kth eavesdropper, respectively. Thus, the achieved secrecy rate at the legitimate user is expressed as follows:
(1) The harvested energy at the lth EH receiver is written as
where ξ l ∈ (0, 1] is the energy conversion efficiency of the energy transducers, at the lth ER, that accounts for the loss in the energy transducers for converting the harvested energy to electrical energy to be stored [23] . For convenience, we assume that ξ l = 1 ∀ l, in this paper. Remark 1: This system model consists of L EH receivers, which harvest power carried by the RF signal without AN or with AN based on a reliable transmission scenario. These EH receivers sometimes play a "helper" role by employing the harvested power to introduce a jamming signal to confuse the eavesdroppers [27] . However, the efficiency of this harvest-andjamming policy is dependent on the network topology [28] . In this paper, we mainly focus on the secrecy rate optimization without AN or with AN. The EH performance of the EH receivers is exploited, whereas how to use the harvested power is outside the scope of our paper.
III. SECRECY RATE MAXIMIZATION
WITHOUT ARTIFICIAL NOISE Here, we consider a MISO secrecy channel with multiple eavesdroppers and EH receivers described in Section II, where secure beamforming is designed without AN to achieve the secrecy rate maximization subject to the transmit power and the EH constraints. This optimization is written as follows:
where P is the maximum available transmit power at the legitimate transmitter, and E denotes the target harvested energy of the EH receivers. These aforementioned problems are not convex and cannot be solved directly. Unlike existing literature [24] , where rank relaxation is considered to reformulate the secrecy rate, it is challenging to show a rank-one solution. In this paper, we propose a novel relaxation method for the secrecy rate maximization problem to circumvent rank relaxation. The secrecy rate maximization problem (3) is not convex, in terms of the nonconvex secrecy rate objective function and EH constraint, and cannot be solved directly. Thus, this problem can be solved by considering a sequence of power minimization problems, one for each target rate R > 0. The optimal solution of the secrecy rate maximization problem can be obtained by solving the corresponding power minimization problem with different R, which can be obtained by using a bisection search over R [29] , [30] . Next, we will focus on the following power minimization problem:
A. Power Minimization
Now, we consider the power minimization problem based on the assumption that the transmitter has perfect CSI of the legitimate user, the eavesdroppers, and the EH receivers. Thus, the problem in (4) can be relaxed as
The aforementioned problem is not convex in terms of the nonconvex secrecy rate and EH constraints. To circumvent these issues, the following lemma is required to tackle the power minimization problem (5) . Lemma 1: The problem in (5) is reformulated into the following form:
Proof: See Appendix A. In problem (6), the secrecy rate constraint is reformulated into a linear matrix inequality (LMI), whereas the EH constraint is approximated by a first-order Taylor series expansion; thus, this problem is a convex problem for a given u l . An initialization value of the vector u l is randomly generated and can be updated at each iteration. The algorithm converges when u (n+1) l = u (n) l holds, and it is guaranteed to converge to a locally optimal solution (quite close to the globally optimal solution) [31] , [32] .
B. Robust Power Minimization
In the previous section, we have solved the power minimization problem based on the assumption that the legitimate transmitter has perfect CSI. However, it is not always possible to have perfect CSI due to the lack of cooperation, as well as channel estimation and quantization errors. Thus, we consider the robust scheme by incorporating norm-bounded channel uncertainties in the following.
1) Channel Uncertainty: Here, it is assumed that the CSI is not available at the legitimate transmitter. The channel uncertainties are modeled as h s =h s + e s , h e,k =h e,k + e e,k ∀ k, h l =h l + e l ∀ l whereh s ,h e,k , andh l denote the estimated channels of the legitimate user, the kth eavesdropper, and the lth EH receiver, and e s , e e,k , and e l represent the corresponding channel errors, which are assumed to be bounded as
where ε s , ε e,k , and ε l represent the norm bounds of the channel errors.
2) Robust Power Minimization With Channel Uncertainty:
Now, we solve the robust power minimization problem by incorporating the channel uncertainties. Thus, this robust problem is formulated as follows:
Problem (7) is not convex, in terms of channel uncertainties, and cannot be solved directly. Thus, we first consider the reformulation of the secrecy rate constraint in (7a), which can be relaxed as
The first constraint in (8) is rewritten based on a first-order Taylor approximation as follows:
). Lemma 2: The second constraint in (8) can be reformulated as
where
Proof: See Appendix B. Thus, the robust power minimization problem can be written as
The aforementioned problem is convex for a given t (n) 2 at each iteration. Thus, an initialization of t 2 is given to solve the problem in (12) by using interior-point methods [33] , which is updated iteratively. It is easily observed that t 2 is updated to t (n+1) 2 = t n 2 , when the algorithm converges.
IV. SECURE SIMULTANEOUS WIRELESS INFORMATION AND POWER TRANSFER OF JOINT BEAMFORMING AND ARTIFICIAL NOISE DESIGN
In the previous section, we have solved the secrecy rate optimization problems to optimize the transmit beamforming without AN. Here, we extend our attention to joint transmit beamforming and AN design in the secrecy rate maximization problem, where the legitimate transmitter sends the signal with AN to introduce more interference to the eavesdroppers.
A. Problem Formulation
We formulate the secrecy rate maximization problem with the transmit power and the minimum EH constraints, where the secured transmit beamforming (i.e., w) and AN beamforming (i.e., v ∼ CN (0, V)) are jointly designed. This optimization problem can be formulated as
The proposed relaxation method is also suitable for the scenario where the eavesdroppers and the EH receivers are equipped with multiple antennas [34, Sec. V-D].
This optimization problem (13) is not convex and cannot be solved directly. Thus, we propose two reformulations to make this problem tractable, i.e., 1-D line-search-based two-level optimization algorithm and SCA, unlike [25] , where it was shown that the relaxed problem returns rank two. In this paper, we provide a novel SDR for the secrecy rate maximization problem, and we show that the optimal solution always returns rank one. We first employ the SDR to relax the original problem (13) by using Q s = E{ww H } as follows:
where A i = a i a H i is the given antenna design parameters to adjust each antenna power budget, and a i is a unit ith vector (i.e., [a i ] j = 1 for i = j and [a i ] j = 0 for i = j). The specific applications of each antenna power constraint have already been described in [17] and [23] .
B. Secrecy Rate Maximization
For the secrecy rate maximization problem (13), we will provide two different algorithms to jointly optimize the transmit beamforming and AN covariance matrix: 1-D line-search-based two-level optimization algorithm and SCA. 1) One-Dimensional Line-Search-Based Two-Level Optimization Algorithm: We first introduce a slack variable t, and (13) is rewritten as
Problem (15) is still not convex, in terms of the constraint (15a), and cannot be solved directly; thus, it can be formulated as a two-stage optimization problem. The outer problem is a function of t, which can be written as
It is easily derived that the lower bound t min = (1 + (P h s 2 / σ 2 s )) −1 . Then, the inner problem can be recast for a given t as follows:
It is easily verified that the constraint in (15) can be reformulated as
Then, (17) can be recast for a given t as
Problem (19) is a quasi-convex problem without the nonconvex rank-one constraint; thus, we consider the Charnes-Cooper transformation to convert it into a convex problem. Let us introduce δ, so that Q s =Q s /δ and V =V/δ hold. Thus, we have
Problem (20) is a convex problem, and this can be solved efficiently by using an interior-point method [33] . Thus, the optimal solution to (19) can be obtained when rank(Q s ) = 1 holds, which will be shown in Section IV-B2, once (20) has been solved.
2) Tightness Analyses of Rank Relaxation: Now, we investigate the tightness of the rank relaxation to (19) . We assume that the optimal value f (t) can be obtained by the optimal solution to (19) , resulting in the following inequality:
Thus, we consider the following power minimization: 
It is easily verified that the feasible solution of (22) is the optimal solution of (19), due to the constraints (21), (14a), (14b), and (14c). Thus, the following theorem is provided to show that every optimal solution to (22) is rank one. Theorem 1: If (19) is feasible, there always exists an optimal solution (i.e., Q s ) that satisfies rank(Q s ) ≤ 1, which can be obtained by solving (22) .
Proof: See Appendix C. From Theorem 1, a tightness analysis has been provided, so that (19) has a rank-one solution for all feasible t.
3) SCA: Here, we propose a SCA algorithm to jointly optimize the transmit beamforming and AN; thus, (13) can be rewritten as
The aforementioned problem is not convex in terms of the objective function. Let us introduce the following exponential variables to equivalently convert the objective function:
Thus, (23) is rewritten by introducing a slack variable τ as
The aforementioned problem is not still convex in terms of the constraint (25d). Thus, a Taylor series expansion (i.e., ax + ax ln a(x −x) ≤ a x ) is employed to linearize (25d) as follows:
whereŷ 0 andŷ k are approximated values, such that y 0 =ŷ 0 and y k =ŷ k , when the approximations are tight. Thus, the secrecy rate maximization problem can be relaxed as
Problem (27) is convex without the nonconvex rank-one constraint, for a given (ŷ 0 ,ŷ k ), and can be solved by using an interior-point method. From SCA, the approximation with the current optimal solution can be updated iteratively until the constraints (25c) and (25d) hold with equality, which implies that (23) is optimally solved. The optimal solution obtained by the SCA algorithm at the nth iteration is assumed to be (Q * s (n), V * (n), x * 0 (n), y * 0 (n), x * k (n), y * k (n), τ * (n)), which can achieve a stable point when the SCA algorithm converges [35] . In addition, provided that (23) is feasible for positive secrecy rates, there exists an optimal solution of rank one, and the proof is similar to that of Theorem 1.
C. Robust Secrecy Rate Maximization
Here, we turn our attention to the robust secrecy rate maximization, which jointly optimizes the transmit beamforming and AN by incorporating channel uncertainties shown in Section III-B1. In addition, the transmit power constraint per antenna is considered, where the Hermitian PSD matrix A i is not available at the legitimate transmitter; thus, the true PSD matrix can be written as A i =Ā i + Δ i ∀ i, whereĀ i ∈ H N T + is the estimated Hermitian PSD matrix, and Δ i is the estimated error of the matrixĀ i , which can be modeled as a spherical uncertainty with a norm-bound i ( Δ i F ≤ i ) [20] . In the following, we relax the robust secrecy rate maximization problem by incorporating the channel uncertainties. 1) One-Dimensional Line-Search-Based Two-Level Optimization Algorithm: Here, a robust scheme is considered to jointly optimize transmit beamforming and AN by incorporating channel uncertainties. Thus, the two-level optimization framework discussed in the previous subsection is employed by incorporating channel uncertainties. Since the outer problem does not involve the channel uncertainties similar to Section IV-B1, thus, we focus on the inner problem for a given t, which can be reformulated as
The aforementioned problem is not convex due to channel uncertainties. Thus, we employ S-Procedure to solve this robust secrecy rate maximization problem, which can be written as
Let us introduce a slack variable τ to relax the objective function to (29) , and by exploiting S-Procedure and Charnes-Cooper transformation, we have
Without the nonconvex rank constraint, (30) is a convex problem. By solving (30), we can obtain the optimal value f (t) * , which can be written based on channel uncertainties as
Thus, the associated power minimization problem is considered as
Tr(Q s )
It is easily verified that the feasible solution to (32) is optimal for (29) , which is derived from (32a) and (32b). Thus, the following theorem holds to show that the optimal solution to (29) is rank one.
Theorem 2: Provided that (29) is feasible, its optimal solution always returns rank one, which can be obtained by solving (32) .
Proof: See Appendix D. 2) SCA: Now, we consider the second reformulation based on SCA for the secrecy rate maximization problem to jointly optimize transmit beamforming and AN covariance matrix. The optimization framework can also be reformulated as a convex form by incorporating channel uncertainties. Thus, this robust secrecy rate maximization problem can be rewritten as
where t e,k 
The aforementioned problem is convex for a givenȳ k andȳ 0 at each iteration and can be solved by using the interior-point method to update the solution for the next iteration until the algorithm converges. On the other hand, there exists a rank-one solution to (36) , and the proof is similar to that of Theorem 2.
V. COMPUTATION COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
Here, we provide the computation complexity analysis for our proposed algorithms in Sections III and IV, which is analyzed by applying the basic elements of complexity analysis as used in [36] .
First, we consider the secrecy rate maximization problem without AN in perfect and imperfect CSI, where a bisection search is employed to solve (6) and (12) , and M max 1 and T 1 are defined as the iteration number of the Taylor approximation and bisection search, respectively. Problem (6) has one secondorder cone (SOC) constraint of dimension N T + 1, K LMI constraints of size 3, and L linear constraints. Here, the number of decision variables n is on the order of N T + 2L + 1. While (12) involves L + 2 SOCs, including two SOCs with dimension N T + 1, L SOCs with dimension N T , K LMI constraints of size N T + 3, and L linear constraints. The number of variables n is on the order of N T + K + 2.
Then, we provide the computation complexity for the secrecy rate maximization problems (20) and (27) Finally, we consider the computation complexity for the robust secrecy rate problems (30) and (36) by incorporating channel uncertainties. Problem (30) has N T SOCs with dimension 2N T + 1, K + L + 2 LMI constraints with size N T + 1, 2 LMI constraints with size N T , and L + K + 3 linear constraints. The number of variables n is on the order of 2N T + K + L + 3. On the other hand, (36) involves N T with dimension 2N T + 1, 2K + L + 2 LMI constraints with size N T + 1, and 5K + L + 5 linear constraints. The number of variables n is on the order of 2N T + 6K + L + 6. Based on the aforementioned analysis, the computation complexities for all of our proposed algorithms are shown in Table I .
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Here, we provide simulation results to validate our proposed algorithms. We consider a MISO secrecy system in the presence of three eavesdroppers and two EH receivers. The legitimate transmitter is equipped with four transmit antennas (i.e., N T = 4), whereas the other receivers (i.e., legitimate user, eavesdroppers, and EH receivers) are equipped with a single antenna. We assume channel models with both large-scale fading and smallscale fading. The simplified large-scale fading model is given by D = A 0 (d/d r ) −α , for d ≥ d r , where A 0 = 1, d represents the distance between the transmitter and all receivers (i.e., legitimate user d s , passive eavesdroppers d e , and the ERs d l ), d r denotes a reference distance set to be 20 m, and α = 3 is the path-loss exponent. The small-scale fading channel coefficients are assumed to be Rician fading with the Rician factor of 5 dB. Note that the line-of-sight component is modeled as the far-field uniform linear antenna array [37] . In addition, we assume that σ 2 s = σ 2 e = −40 dBm, and the distances between the transmitter and the legitimate user, the passive eavesdroppers, as well as the ERs are set to be 100, 50, and 25 m, respectively, unless otherwise specified. The target transmit power is assumed to be 30 dBm or 1 W, and the target harvested power is set to be 1 mW. All error bounds (i.e., ε s , ε e,k , and ε l ) are replaced by ε for convenience, which is set to be 0.1 or 0.2 unless otherwise specified.
We first provide simulation results for the case without AN. Fig. 1 shows the achieved secrecy rate with different transmit power values, where it is easily observed that the achieved secrecy rate increases with transmit power, and our proposed scheme achieves the same performance with the SDR-based scheme in terms of achieved secrecy rate. To improve the security in SWIPT, AN-assisted secrecy rate versus transmit power is plotted in Fig. 2 based on two of our proposed schemes: 1-D search-based two-level optimization algorithm and SCA. From this result, we can observe that the two proposed schemes increase with transmit power, and both schemes have a similar performance in terms of secrecy rate. In addition, in the lower transmit power regime, the SCA-based scheme outperforms the 1-D search-based two-level optimization scheme ("1D").
Then, we evaluate the security performance with EH. Fig. 3 shows the achieved secrecy rate versus the target harvested power, where it can be observed that the secrecy rate decreases with the target harvested power based on perfect and imperfect CSI. In addition, we compare our proposed schemes ("1D" and "SCA") with the scheme shown in [25] ("1D Benchmark"), the 1-D line-search-based scheme with Gaussian randomization ("1D GR"), the 2-D search-based scheme ("2D"), and the case without AN ("NO AN"), in which our proposed SCA-based scheme outperforms our proposed 1D scheme, 1D Benchmark scheme, 1D GR scheme, and NO AN scheme. The SCA-based scheme has a similar performance to the 2D based scheme, in terms of secrecy rate. Fig. 4 shows the AN power consumption percentage of the total transmit power P with different transmit power values, which shows the proportion of AN power consumed to confuse the eavesdroppers or for EH. One can observe that this proportion increases and then declines after approximately 26 dBm, due to the low signal-to noise ratios at the legitimate user and passive eavesdroppers at the low transmit power regime. Therefore, it is not necessary to consume a large amount of AN power. With the increase in transmit power, the percentage of consumed AN power should increase, which ensures secure communications and satisfies the EH constraint. When transmit power is high enough, to further increase the secrecy rate required, more power should be allocated to the message-bearing signals so that the AN power may get decreased. The scheme without EH receivers has a lower proportion than the scheme with EH receivers, since the AN is introduced to interfere with the passive eavesdropper only in the system without the EH receiver.
Finally, we evaluate the secrecy rate and the EH performance versus the distances between the transmitter and the legitimate user (i.e., d s ), as well as the EH receivers (i.e., d l ), respectively, when P = 20 dBm. Fig. 5 shows the secrecy rate versus d s , where one can observe that the secrecy rate decreases with d s . In addition, the SCA-based scheme outperforms the 1D-based scheme in terms of secrecy rate. Fig. 6 shows the EH performance versus d l . From this result, the harvested power decreases with d l , approaching zero after d s = 40 m.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the secrecy rate maximization problem for a MISO secrecy channel with SWIPT in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers and EH receivers. We first proposed a novel reformulation to optimize the transmit beamforming without AN based on perfect CSI and imperfect CSI. Then, joint optimization for transmit beamforming with AN has been considered for the secrecy rate maximization problem based on both perfect and imperfect CSI. We reformulated this optimization problem by using the 1-D line-search-based twolevel optimization and SCA-based schemes, respectively. Furthermore, we provided a tightness analysis for this optimization problem, which shows that the optimal solution of this secrecy rate maximization problem exactly returns rank one. Simulation results have been provided to validate the performance of our proposed schemes.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 1
To prove Lemma 1, we first rewrite the secrecy rate constraint in (5) as
By exploiting the Schur complement [33] , (37) can be reformulated as ⎡
In addition, we consider the reformulation of the EH constraint in (5) . To express this constraint clearly, we introduce two variables (i.e., x l ∈ R and y l ∈ R) such that this constraint can be equivalently modified as
The constraint (39b) is convex (linear), whereas (39a) is not convex; thus, a first-order Taylor approximation is considered to obtain the desired upper bound.
is the nth iteration of the vector u l . Thus, (39a) can be approximated as
where i denotes the ith element of the vector u l . This completes Lemma 1.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF LEMMA 2
The second constraint in (8) can be rewritten by exploiting the Schur complement as
where f (n) (t 2 ) has been defined in (9) . To remove the impact of the channel uncertainties, we employ [38, Prop. 2] , and the constraint in (41) is written as
Thus, the robust secrecy rate constraint can be reformulated as
This completes Lemma 2.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 1
To show Theorem 1, we check the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of (22) . First, its Lagrange dual function can be written as (21) , (14a), (14b), and (18), respectively. Then, we consider the following related KKT conditions: This completes Theorem 1.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We first write the dual function to (32) 
Tr(T e,k B k )+ The related KKT conditions are considered as follows: 
